1979-1995 Second Cold War, 1980-1991 End of the Cold War
- 1981-1989: Reaganâs 2 consecutive terms in office as POTUS
- succeeds Jimmy Carter (Dem.) as president, and his two-pronged foreign policy
- before 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Cyrus Vance was Secretary of State â more accommodating to Soviets
- 1979 onwards: Brzezinski was National Secretary of Defense â hardline
- takes a hardline stance on foreign policy + determined to pursue aggressive policies to change Soviet behavior
- saw dĂ©tente as a failure that had eroded American prestige and made them look weak â resulted in âmisplaced trustâ, â power, prestige and influence
- blamed Carter for loss of global power
- returned USA to containment and confrontation â a more Truman-Eisenhower-approach
- returned USA to negotiating from a position of strength with USSR
Triumphalist sequence of events
Triumphalism
Triumphalist position: that Reaganâs role was key to containing the Soviets and put pressure on them
- aka: One Great Man theory
- strong rhetorical language against USSR; Reaganâs hardline approach
- referred to the USSR as the âevil empireâ â strong rhetorical language against the USSR â Soviet moral bankruptcy of communism
- or: the USA cancelled the USSR and strengthened the hand of democracy
- upped the ante for both countries
- referred to the USSR as the âevil empireâ â strong rhetorical language against the USSR â Soviet moral bankruptcy of communism
- U.S. uses scientific and technological strength & advantage to pressure Russians (e.g. SDI)
- showed U.S. advantage to acquire first strike advantage â frightened the Soviets, because they had no solution to counteract
- dramatic increase in military budget (lots of $$$)
- the Soviets werenât in a position to compete with the vast American budget â had to look for more conciliatory ways (aka dĂ©tente, compromise and giving in)
- giving in â America âwinningâ, putting pressure on the USSR
- exposed Soviet economic weakness â states like Ethiopia were bleeding the USSR dry
- marked a switch to diplomacy rather than military conflict
- the Soviets werenât in a position to compete with the vast American budget â had to look for more conciliatory ways (aka dĂ©tente, compromise and giving in)
- all this combines to form the final nail in the Soviet coffin
- the Cold War ends and USSR collapses⊠all because of Reagan
- ??? this is such a Man way of thinking
Ideological offensive
- new rhetoric: âThe Soviet Union is the focus of all evil in the world)
Political offensive
- 1981-1982: Response to Poland situation
- 1981 Dec: martial law imposed by Poland to stem growth of Solidarity trade union â arrest of Solidarity leadership
- 1982 Oct: outlawing of Solidartiy leadership
- U.S. imposed economic & trade sanctions on Poland & USSR ^a14c51
- SIGNIFICANCE: reaffirmed importance of free market, human rights & gave the West the moral high ground (?)
- 1983: Reagan Doctrine
- Roll-Back
- resistance to Soviet expansionism wasnât enough; the West had to go on the offensive with a âforward strategy to freedomâ
- assistance rendered to anti-Communist insurgents & govts
- 1979-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Aided mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan
- 1986: new lightweight ground-to-air missiles supplied â diminished Soviet air superiority
- allowed guerillas the benefit of US satellite & communications information
- 1979-1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Aided mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan
- reassertion of American power in Central America (Grenada, Nicaragua)
- renewal of strategic cooperation with China ([[1949-1976 Communist Chinaâs Foreign Policy and Affairs#1970-1989-triangular-diplomacyyitianxian-äžæĄçșż-one-united-front|1970-1989 Triangular Diplomacy/yitianxian (äžæĄçșż), one united front]])
Economic offensive
Link to original
- blocked various exports to USSR, including vital grain deliveries
Transclude of #^a14c51
- after 1985: all restrictions LIFTED, moving into Reconciliation (1985 onwards)
Military offensive (Militarism and arms control)
Summary
- focus on restoring American military power
- move from defensive to offensive
- AIM: argued massive defence build-up would pressure Soviets to keep up â deplete them of resources
- 1982: increased military expenditure by 13%, then 8% every year after (known as 'window of vulnerability')
- 1982-1989: đ increased military budget from $134b/year to $253b
- largest peacetime budget
- 7% of GDP in 1989
- 5-year program of $180b to modernise strategic nuclear forces
- CIAâs budget increased even omre
- refusal to ratify SALT II and negotiate
- opposition to Soviet action in Afghanistan, Poland
INF Talks
- INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
- Reagan proposed the âzero optionâ, heavily loaded against the USSR
- proposals would have:
- significantly increased U.S. strike capacity
- essentially removing Soviet nuclear power
- the talks were a set-up; the USSR would never accept those terms
- 1989: severely compromised and handicapped treaty signed
START
- START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
- U.S. wanted to deploy missiles in Europe â USSR abandoned the talks
- increased tensions â geographic proximity to the Soviet capitals, a security threat
- the Europeans werenât happy with this â they wanted to reduce tensions with USSR and East Germany
- obviously the U.S. wonât accept this
- for the first time in a decade, the USSR and USA werenât negotiating
- USSR hoped the West could pressure the USA into adopting a more realistic approach to Soviet-American reactions
- Reagan blamed the USSR for abandoning talks
SDI
- SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative (âStar Wars programâ)
- $26b five-year project
- a system of defense against WMDs â aimed to make first strike impossible
- 1983 Mar: Announced a way to repel missiles launched by UISSR â wouldâve made offensive nukes redundant
- 1983 Nov: NATO deployed Pershing II and Cruise missiles â a new generation of nukes that were faster, harder to detect, and very difficult to counter
- moved from deterrence by assured defense to by assured retaliation
- aimed to replace Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) with Mutually Assured Survival (MAS)
- which was a farce because everyone is going to die once you launch đ
- âwe cherish life and yet we design weapons that will take away life in new, innovative livesâ âMr. Han, 2025
- went against anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) treaty agreements signed earlier on
- realistically flawed, could never work â but freaked the Soviets out so badly
- USSR saw it as a U.S. plan to eradicate the Soviet advantage + develop American first-strike capability
| Soviet perception | U.S. perception |
|---|---|
sent shockwaves through the Politburo; they didnât realize it was fully theoretical and unlikely to work
| big money involved with many vested interests
|